imperfect information
In game theory, situations where players lack full knowledge of the game state or others' moves, such as poker, which motivated von Neumann's development of game theory.
As defined in 329 | Steven Pinker on Rationality and Common Knowledge
Where it comes up · 3
- Chris Blattman on Why We Fight5 claims
- Steve Fazzari on Stimulus and Keynes 01/24/20111 claim
- 329 | Steven Pinker on Rationality and Common Knowledge1 claim
Most important claims · 7 of 7Search all claims for “imperfect information” →
- Unemployment is not clearly voluntary, because workers under uncertainty cannot know whether demand for their skill will return in three months or ten years, and imperfect information about job openings elsewhere also keeps people unemployed, so the classical view that all markets clear is wrong.Steve Fazzari on Stimulus and Keynes 01/24/2011
- The fundamental psychological error driving group conflict is persistently wrong beliefs about the other side: misperception requires uncertainty, because amid uncertainty a leader draws an inference about the opponent's strength or resolve that is way off, and this kind of overconfident, off-base inference is astonishingly common and persistent—not only in war but in finance, CEO decisions, and investing.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- The first cause of war is not a 'miscalculation' but a correct calculation under imperfect information: when you genuinely don't know your opponent's strength and they have an incentive to bluff that they're strong to get a better deal, your optimal strategy may sometimes be to attack to find out—like calling or bluffing in poker—and even without bluffing, if both sides start with sufficiently different priors about relative strength, that inherent uncertainty alone is a risk factor for war.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- All explanations for why rivals fail to find a peaceful bargain fall into five buckets: (1) uncertainty/imperfect information combined with incentives to bluff, (2) commitment problems such as preventive war when one side will be much stronger later, (3) unchecked leaders who don't internalize war's costs or have private incentives to fight, (4) intangible or 'stable' preferences like status, vengeance, or ideology that aren't in the material pie, and (5) misperceptions—persistently wrong beliefs about the other side.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- When uncertainty and the commitment problem are layered on top of one another, they create impersonal situational forces that drastically narrow the space for a peaceful agreement; leaders' mistakes and foibles—which observers tend to overestimate—then become crucial only because the room to find a deal was already so small.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- In imperfect-information strategic standoffs like poker bluffing or a hockey shooter versus goalie, the optimal strategy is to be perfectly random, because any deviation or preference is a tell the opponent can exploit—yet generating true randomness is very hard for humans.329 | Steven Pinker on Rationality and Common Knowledge
- Most wars, when they happen, are short—the unconditional probability based on history is that a conflict like Russia-Ukraine ends within a month or two—because once fighting resolves the uncertainty about relative strength, the bargaining incentives reassert themselves; the salient exceptions like long quagmires are remembered while the many quickly-resolved interventions (e.g., 1994 Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia) are forgotten.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight