hard problem of consciousness
The philosophical problem, associated with David Chalmers, of explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective inner experience, as distinct from the 'easy' problems of perception and behavior.
As defined in ms_44
Other definitions
David Chalmers's term for the problem of explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience at all, as opposed to merely identifying which processes correlate with it.
309 | Christof Koch on Consciousness and Integrated Information
Where it comes up · 40
- 178 - The Reality Illusion4 claims
- 34 - The Light Of The Mind3 claims
- What Creates Consciousness? | World Science Festival2 claims
- Micheal Pollan On The Mystery Of Consciousness.2 claims
- Human vs. Machine Consciousness | Imperial’s Murray Shanahan2 claims
- Steven Pinker2 claims
- 227 - Knowing The Mind2 claims
- 239 - Yet Another Call From Ricky Gervais2 claims
and 32 more
Most important claims · 10 of 61Search all claims for “hard problem of consciousness” →
- The intuitive impasse of the hard problem—that something seems left out when consciousness is reduced to neural firing—does not prove physicalism false; we may simply be in a bad cognitive position to understand how consciousness emerges, so that even a correct answer (e.g. 40 Hz oscillations) might forever feel like a brute fact that explains nothing.374 - Consciousness And The Physical World
- We may build AIs that pass the Turing test and claim to be conscious while we remain unable to decide whether they actually are; we could be helplessly gamed into attributing consciousness to non-conscious systems (or fail to recognize genuine consciousness), and many people—even scientists—could lose sight of the hard problem of consciousness entirely, yet there will always be a fact of the matter.305 - Moral Knowledge
- If consciousness arises from information processing and is substrate-independent, we may eventually build genuinely conscious AIs capable of vastly greater ranges of well-being and suffering than humans; such beings would then be morally more important than we are—just as we are more important than chickens—and this would not refute consequentialism but rather follow from it.305 - Moral Knowledge
- Leibniz, 300 years before Hoffman, recognized the hard problem of consciousness and solved it by proposing monadology—a view that experiences and probabilistic relationships are fundamental and physical bodies are secondary phenomenaConscious Agents vs Cognitive Agents with Donald Hoffman and Michael Levin
- Conceivability arguments like Chalmers's zombie thought experiments are very weak because an ill-defined folk-psychological umbrella term like 'consciousness' lets you generate any scenario; the hard problem clarified issues in the mid-90s but serious researchers have moved on.96 - The Nature Of Consciousness
- No existing theory of consciousness is scientifically respectable because none provides a mathematically precise statement of which exact pattern of neural activity (or microtubule collapse) is the taste of vanilla and principled reasons why it could not be the taste of chocolate; absent such precision, claims that neural activity is a given experience are mere hand-waving, not science.178 - The Reality Illusion
- The hard problem of consciousness (why information-processing neurons feel like something) may not be a genuine scientific puzzle but a quirk of how our minds reflect on themselves; the mind examining itself is naturally puzzled because the part doing the articulating is part of the very thing it is trying to explain, so this is a case where human intuition hits a wall like the nature of time or before the Big Bang.Steven Pinker
- Harris, sharing Chalmers's priors, argues that even a perfect neural correlate or reporter of the difference between two dreams would not be explanatory in the way science usually is: it would remain a brute fact that does not reach into and explain why there is something it is like to be associated with that pattern rather than another, which is what makes the hard problem hard.322 - Predicting Reality
- Carroll finds Penrose's proposal that quantum processes in the brain enable non-computable cognition both unconvincing and irrelevant to the hard problem of consciousness, because it concerns how the brain reasons rather than why there is subjective experience.360 | Marc Berman on the Science of Touching Grass
- Even a complete scientific account of consciousness will still feel like the restatement of a miracle, because unlike explanations of higher-level properties such as life, fluidity, or brittleness—which run through and conserve our intuitions—any account of why information processing is accompanied by subjective experience does not satisfy our intuitions; the hard problem is thus epistemological rather than ontological.96 - The Nature Of Consciousness