half-court tennis
Paine's metaphor for analyzing wars or foreign policy by examining only one's own side's actions rather than studying the adversary, leading to flawed causal reasoning and strategic surprise.
As defined in Sarah Paine — Why Japan lost WWII (lecture & interview)
Where it comes up · 2
- Sarah C. M. Paine — Why dictators keep making the same fatal mistake2 claims
- Sarah Paine — Why Japan lost WWII (lecture & interview)2 claims
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- The Hawley-Smoot tariff was a self-defeating game of half-court tennis: by raising tariff walls to protect US jobs in the Depression, the US provoked retaliatory walls that shut down international trade, made trade-dependent nations desperate, and created the hothouse conditions for fascists to take power in Germany and Japan.Sarah Paine — Why Japan lost WWII (lecture & interview)
- Americans tend to analyze international affairs and wars by focusing only on what America did or didn't do ('half-court tennis'), which produces flawed causal understanding and repeated strategic surprises, as in Iraq and against Japan in WWII.Sarah Paine — Why Japan lost WWII (lecture & interview)
- The 1930 Hawley-Smoot tariff was American half-court tennis that triggered retaliatory tariffs and pulled the rug out from trade-dependent Japan's internationalist faction, leading directly to Japan concluding it needed an empire for food and basics—Smoot-Hawley in 1930 was followed by the invasion of Manchuria in 1931.Sarah C. M. Paine — Why dictators keep making the same fatal mistake
- Americans are prone to 'half-court tennis'—studying the world only from their own point of view so that adversary moves seem to come from mysterious places—whereas good foreign-policy decisions require accurately assessing the other side, understanding the world from their point of view; a quick test of a book is to flip to the bibliography for 30 seconds to see if it cites sources in the languages of the countries discussed.Sarah C. M. Paine — Why dictators keep making the same fatal mistake