gain of function
Research that enhances a pathogen's transmissibility or virulence, debated for its risk of leaks and benefit of understanding pathogens.
As defined in David Deutsch - AI, America, Fun, & Bayes
Where it comes up · 4
- Special Episode Engineering The Apocalypse4 claims
- David Deutsch - AI, America, Fun, & Bayes1 claim
- 270 - What Have We Learned From The Pandemic1 claim
- 334 - The Low-trust Society1 claim
Most important claims · 7 of 7Search all claims for “gain of function” →
- Belief in open-ended scientific progress does not license stopping research because dangerous knowledge might emerge; instead it makes it reasonable to first research how to make labs more secure, treating which knowledge to discover first as a non-trivial scheduling problem that is part of the same experiment.David Deutsch - AI, America, Fun, & Bayes
- Far-right claims that Fauci funded Chinese gain-of-function research are disingenuous; in reality the government funded the EcoHealth Alliance partnership collecting coronaviruses in Chinese caves, and Trump's defunding of that partnership was injurious because it pulled the rug out precisely when collaboration would have been most useful for tracing the virus's origin.270 - What Have We Learned From The Pandemic
- Those with cultural power should be suspicious of using it to shut down even the entertaining of alternate views; the early demonization of the COVID lab-leak hypothesis and Twitter's decision to suppress the Hunter Biden laptop story are both examples of people using cultural power to silence views that turned out to be legitimate.334 - The Low-trust Society
- Several years ago scientists deliberately created an airborne-transmissible form of H5N1 flu (which naturally kills ~60% of victims but is barely contagious) by serially passaging it through ferrets, producing what the lead researcher called 'probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make'—and this work was done in BSL-3 labs, a notch below the highest security rating.Special Episode Engineering The Apocalypse
- Governments worldwide should collaborate on tough regulations forbidding distribution of synthetic DNA to anonymous or known bad actors, providing dangerous DNA only to highly trusted customers with excellent reasons, and pandemic-grade DNA should never be synthesized or distributed at all—nor should living organisms ever be mutated in ways that could cause devastating pandemics, because no lab is 100% secure.Special Episode Engineering The Apocalypse
- Any pathogen can potentially escape from any lab of any biosafety level because humans and labs are fallible, as shown by the 1978 smallpox leak from a British lab (which killed the last smallpox victim), Britain's 2007 foot-and-mouth leak from a BSL-4 lab, and the 2001 anthrax attack originating from a US Army biodefense lab.Special Episode Engineering The Apocalypse
- Despite its conceptual value in anticipating natural mutations, gain-of-function research should not be carried out at all, for two reasons: nature may never have created these ghastly pathogens otherwise, and no lab of any security level can be immune from accidents—so the research inevitably brings god-awful pathogens into existence that could imperil civilization.Special Episode Engineering The Apocalypse