fully non-indexical conditioning
Radford Neal's approach in which you condition on everything you know about yourself except your location in the universe, treating yourself as typical only within the set of observers macroscopically identical to you.
As defined in 200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
Where it comes up · 2
- 200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse3 claims
- 345 | Adam Elga on Being Rational in a Very Large Universe1 claim
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “fully non-indexical conditioning” →
- Radford Neal's fully non-indexical conditioning holds that you should condition on everything you know about yourself (memories, age, observations) except your location in the universe, and assume you are typical only within the set of observers macroscopically identical to you; this eliminates the Doomsday and Jovian presumptuousness because you can no longer infer anything about future humans or aliens, while still allowing anthropic predictions.200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
- Adopting fully non-indexical conditioning still recovers standard anthropic predictions: by interpreting the probability of the data as the probability that an observer like you exists (roughly proportional to the number of observers until it saturates), and temporarily pretending you do not already know the cosmological constant, you reproduce exactly what Weinberg did in 1988 using the number of galaxies as a proxy for observers, so physicists get the right answer for the wrong reasons.200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
- Carroll tentatively endorses giving a bonus to cosmological scenarios with more observers, but only because larger universes have a higher probability of producing an observer like you, not because of an a priori preference for many observers; this bonus saturates once observers like you become nearly inevitable, distinguishing his view from the pure self-indication assumption which would boost indefinitely with observer count.200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
- Carroll's preferred approach (close to Radford Neal's fully non-indexical conditioning) judges theories by the probability that in that theory at least one observer exactly like you arises; this boosts large stochastic theories with many observers but does not keep giving an infinite boost as duplicates multiply, because all that matters is that at least one such observer exists.345 | Adam Elga on Being Rational in a Very Large Universe