free-floating rationales
Reasons that genuinely explain why a behavior occurs but are not understood or represented by the organism doing it—rationales uncovered by natural selection rather than held in the agent's mind.
As defined in 78 | Daniel Dennett on Minds, Patterns, and the Scientific Image
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- Many phenomena have clear rationales that are not the reasons of the organisms involved—'free-floating rationales' uncovered by natural selection—as when gazelles 'stot' (make extravagant leaps) to signal fitness to lions, the lions discriminate and avoid the stotting ones, yet neither the gazelle nor the lion understands why; they are beneficiaries of a rational system they don't comprehend.78 | Daniel Dennett on Minds, Patterns, and the Scientific Image
- Paul Grice's theory of meaning—that an utterer intends the hearer to form a belief and to recognize that intention, producing reflexive third-order intentions—was not lying nor a description of everyday psychology (children converse deeply before they can reflect this way); rather, like ethologists explaining stotting, Grice was uncovering the free-floating rationales of human communication: why communication has the forms it does and works, not what speakers consciously think.78 | Daniel Dennett on Minds, Patterns, and the Scientific Image