extension
In Cartesian and early modern philosophy, spatial dimension or the property of occupying space; in Descartes, one of two substances (res extensa), contrasted with thinking substance (res cogitans). In Spinoza, one of infinitely many attributes of the one substance
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz
Where it comes up · 2
- A History of Philosophy | 38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza1 claim
Most important claims · 3 of 3Search all claims for “extension” →
- Descartes maintains a qualitative dualism of mind and body—that thinking things (mind) and extending things (body) are qualitatively different substances—within a theistic metaphysical context, whereas Spinoza is a quantitative monist (one substance) with qualitative dualism (thought and extension as qualitatively different attributes).A History of Philosophy | 38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz
- God has infinite attributes, but only two attributes—thought and extension—are known to us; Spinoza does not claim we know all of God's attributes but only that there may be infinite other attributes beyond what we experience as thought and mind or extension and body.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Leibniz rejects mechanistic science as an ultimate explanation of reality because mechanistic science cannot account for fundamental properties of material bodies such as inertia—the fact that a body continues in the state of motion or rest in which it naturally is—and therefore extension alone cannot be the basic property of matter.A History of Philosophy | 38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz