explanatory gap
A place in a theory where it jumps from one set of facts to another without an account of how the transition happens; Goff cites the gap between physical properties and conscious qualities.
As defined in 71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
Other definitions
In philosophy of mind, the apparent impossibility of fully explaining how subjective conscious experience (qualia) arises from physical brain processes; Grossberg argues his mathematical models bridge this gap
How Does Each Brain Make A Mind? Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) & Consciousness | Stephen Grossberg
Where it comes up · 6
- 34 - The Light Of The Mind2 claims
- 71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere2 claims
- How Does Each Brain Make A Mind? Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) & Consciousness | Stephen Grossberg1 claim
- Does Parenting Make You a Better Person? (with Erik Hoel)1 claim
- 475 - The Hard Problem Of Consciousness1 claim
- Ask Me Anything 121 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “explanatory gap” →
- Parenting is like the 'Mary the color scientist' thought experiment: everyone already knows intellectually what parenting is like from the outside, but actually experiencing it is qualitatively different from knowing it, which is why 'parenting is great' essays feel both obvious and unconvincing to the uninitiated.Does Parenting Make You a Better Person? (with Erik Hoel)
- Even if we had a complete third-person description of the functional characteristics or neural correlates from which consciousness emerges, the fact that this particular physical arrangement produces an inner world would remain totally non-explanatory—there is an explanatory gap, and whatever the correct answer turns out to be, it will still look like a miracle.475 - The Hard Problem Of Consciousness
- Because physics is cast in terms of mathematical structure and dynamics, which suit explaining behavior but always leave a gap in explaining why there is experience, consciousness cannot be explained in terms of standard physical processes; therefore we must add something to our fundamental catalog—either a new dualist property alongside space, time, mass, and charge, or consciousness (or proto-consciousness) built into physics at the bottom level.34 - The Light Of The Mind
- A theory of consciousness should be judged by two constraints: an external constraint of fitting the empirical data, and an internal constraint of minimizing or eliminating explanatory gaps—places where the theory jumps from one set of facts to another with no account of how; materialism, while fitting data, has an enormous internal explanatory gap between quantitative properties and qualitative consciousness, whereas Russell-Eddington panpsychism makes progress by identifying conscious states as the intrinsic nature of physical states.71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
- The 'easy problems' of consciousness concern explaining functions—how we discriminate information, integrate it, control behavior, and monitor our own states—which fall within standard cognitive science by finding mechanisms; the 'hard problem' is why all that processing feels like something from the inside, which is not a problem about behavior or function and therefore resists the usual mechanistic methods.34 - The Light Of The Mind
- Even if materialism is a coherent position, the materialist incurs an explanatory obligation: because we know directly from first-person awareness that consciousness has a qualitative nature, the materialist must show how those qualities are accounted for in the purely quantitative language of physical science, analogous to how chemistry explains the boiling point of water.71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
- Emergent properties of brain behavior cannot be fully understood using purely experimental approaches even with a hundred electrodes in a behaving animal—there is an explanatory gap between data and understanding that requires mathematical models to bridge.How Does Each Brain Make A Mind? Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) & Consciousness | Stephen Grossberg
- Some disagreements, such as whether consciousness is conceptually irreducible (the hard problem) or how the worst-possible-misery claim grounds morality, rest on brute root intuitions that people simply divide on, with one side seeing the explanatory gap and the other unable to perceive it as a problem at all.Ask Me Anything 12