epistemic standards
The criteria by which a community credits something as knowledge—including explicit standards like empirical accuracy and hidden ones like familiarity, beauty, and simplicity.
As defined in 304 | James Evans on Innovation, Consolidation, and the Science of Science
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- Beyond explicit epistemic standards like empirical accuracy through experiment or observation, science is governed by hidden epistemic standards—what is familiar, what we associate with advance, what is beautiful, what is simple—so when science conforms to these deep aesthetic preferences we readily credit and award it, and when it doesn't, recognition is hard.304 | James Evans on Innovation, Consolidation, and the Science of Science
- The reason we struggle to think on long time horizons—even while a species lasts ~3.5 million years on average—is that evidence-based scientific epistemic standards (e.g. requiring a specific flavor of causal identification in economics) are historically useful for field advance but ill-fit for reasoning about singular, never-repeated future catastrophes; since humanity is a single experiment, contemplating existential risk requires new epistemic approaches including narrative and science fiction.304 | James Evans on Innovation, Consolidation, and the Science of Science