eliminativism
The hardcore scientific-realist position that only the scientific image is real and everything in the everyday manifest image (colors, pains, even consciousness) is illusion.
As defined in 78 | Daniel Dennett on Minds, Patterns, and the Scientific Image
Where it comes up · 2
- 25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation2 claims
- 78 | Daniel Dennett on Minds, Patterns, and the Scientific Image1 claim
Most important claims · 3 of 3Search all claims for “eliminativism” →
- The task of philosophy is to explain how things in the broadest sense hang together, which concretely means negotiating between the everyday 'manifest image' (colors, pains, dollars, home runs) and the 'scientific image' (electrons, quarks, fields), and after a century of science there is no simple answer to how they relate.78 | Daniel Dennett on Minds, Patterns, and the Scientific Image
- Chalmers concedes the strongest objection to the zombie hypothesis is the paradox of phenomenal judgment: a zombie twin says and writes exactly the same things about consciousness (even a word-for-word identical book arguing consciousness is irreducible), so the same physical processes that drive our talk about consciousness exist in a being lacking it—forcing the question of whether our own conviction of being conscious is reliable.25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation
- Illusionism is the recently resurgent view that consciousness is an internal introspective illusion: a strong introspective mechanism makes us think we have special phenomenal properties (qualia) when in fact 'all is dark inside,' as it is for a zombie; the view is hard to believe, but it has the dialectical advantage that it predicts we would find it impossible to believe.25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation