easy problems
Problems of explaining the brain's behavioral and functional capacities (perception, reasoning, reporting, wakefulness) that are tractable via finding neural or computational mechanisms—'easy' only in the sense that we have a paradigm for them.
As defined in 25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation
Where it comes up · 3
- 34 - The Light Of The Mind3 claims
- 25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation3 claims
- What Creates Consciousness? | World Science Festival1 claim
Most important claims · 7 of 7Search all claims for “easy problems” →
- A deep puzzle in the zombie thought experiment is why a zombie devoid of phenomenal experience would talk about consciousness at all—but since there are brain mechanisms responsible for everything we say and do, those same mechanisms would produce the zombie's reports, raising the possibility that the things we say about consciousness (an easy problem) might be explicable in physical terms even if the experience itself is not.34 - The Light Of The Mind
- Consciousness is the subjective experience of the mind and world—what it feels like from the first-person point of view to think, perceive, and judge—which must be distinguished from the war of information processing and behavior that accompanies it.34 - The Light Of The Mind
- The analogy between the hard problem of life and hard problem of consciousness is imperfect because life's hard problem concerned objective functional properties (reproduction, adaptation, metabolism) that could in principle be mechanistically explained, whereas consciousness's hard problem concerns subjective phenomenal experience (first-person experience) which has no analog in the case of life except consciousness itself.What Creates Consciousness? | World Science Festival
- The 'easy problems' of consciousness concern explaining functions—how we discriminate information, integrate it, control behavior, and monitor our own states—which fall within standard cognitive science by finding mechanisms; the 'hard problem' is why all that processing feels like something from the inside, which is not a problem about behavior or function and therefore resists the usual mechanistic methods.34 - The Light Of The Mind
- The meta-problem of consciousness is explaining why we think we are conscious and why we think there is a hard problem; crucially, this is a problem about behavior (the things we say and do), hence an easy problem with a possible mechanistic solution, and Chalmers proposes it as a topic-neutral research program that materialists, dualists, and illusionists can all pursue.25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation
- The hard problem of consciousness is explaining how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience; unlike behavioral capacities, which can be explained by finding neural or computational mechanisms, subjective experience resists this standard method because explaining all the behavior still leaves open why it is accompanied by experience rather than going on 'in the dark'.25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation
- The 'easy problems' of mind—sophisticated behavioral capacities like walking, talking, communicating, and reasoning—are 'easy' not because they are simple but because we have a paradigm for explaining them: find the neural or computational mechanism that produces the behavior, and in principle you have an explanation, even if the details take a century to work out.25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation