double liability
A 19th- and early-20th-century rule under which bank shareholders could be assessed an additional amount equal to the par value of their stock to repay creditors if the bank failed.
As defined in Eugene White on Bank Regulation
Where it comes up · 2
- Eugene White on Bank Regulation2 claims
- A Masterclass In Central Banking | Professor Jane Knodell2 claims
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “double liability” →
- From after the Civil War to WWI, bank shareholders were subject to double liability: if a bank failed, the receiver could demand from each shareholder an additional contribution equal to the par value of their stock, which made shareholders monitor management closely and prompted them to close failing banks before they went over the edge rather than gamble for resurrection.Eugene White on Bank Regulation
- Double liability was abolished because the Great Depression's systemic shock made it nearly impossible to collect funds from shareholders to pay depositors; at the same time that FDIC insurance was introduced, double liability was cancelled, and deposit insurance began as a limited mutual-pool program funded by banks rather than government.Eugene White on Bank Regulation
- Double liability was eliminated in 1934 as part of the New Deal, which also introduced deposit insurance (FDIC)—suggesting a shift from shareholder accountability to government guarantee, potentially reducing shareholder oversight incentives and replacing it with regulatory oversight.A Masterclass In Central Banking | Professor Jane Knodell
- National Bank stockholders had double liability—they had to contribute twice their share purchase value to the bank's creditors if it failed, meaning owning $2,000 of stock exposed you to $4,000 of liability if the bank went bankrupt, giving shareholders strong incentive to oversee bank management.A Masterclass In Central Banking | Professor Jane Knodell