ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself)
In Kantian philosophy, the unknowable reality that exists independent of human perception and cognition; known by contrast to phenomena which are how things appear to us through the forms of space, time, and causality
As defined in Great Minds - Part 4 - Hegel: The Phenomenology of Geist
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- All of 19th century German philosophy stands in the shadow of Kant, and the erosion of the Kantian synthesis and the breakup of Kant's concept of the Ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself) is the source of the most important and fruitful developments in early 19th century German idealism, including Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.Great Minds - Part 4 - Hegel: The Phenomenology of Geist
- Kant's critical philosophy distinguishes between the a priori forms of cognition (space, time, causality, number, being, negation) through which we necessarily experience the world, and the Ding-an-sich (things-in-themselves), which remains unknowable to human understanding but is accessible to God's mind.Great Minds - Part 4 - Hegel: The Phenomenology of Geist
- Kant's critical philosophy does not collapse into explicit idealism precisely because Kant holds onto the thing-in-itself (ding-an-sich) as external reality, which prevents radical solipsism, distinguishing his project from the full idealism of Fichte and Schelling.Great Minds - Part 4 - Hegel: The Phenomenology of Geist