defect
In game theory, to act in one's own narrow interest by breaking from cooperation or coordination with a partner.
As defined in Steven Pinker on Common Knowledge
Where it comes up · 4
- 113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness4 claims
- Steven Pinker on Common Knowledge2 claims
- 269 | Sahar Heydari Fard on Complexity, Justice, and Social Dynamics1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 33 Descartes' Meditations 21 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “defect” →
- The deep reason the prisoner's dilemma is so fascinating is that it is essentially an analysis of altruism: cooperating lowers your own payoff while raising others', which is materially altruistic, yet the game's structure says altruism is not individually rational—so the puzzle is why we observe so much altruism in humans and animals.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- In a basic population without added complexity, the prisoner's dilemma's Nash equilibrium of mutual defection is also the evolutionarily stable strategy: the population will evolve to all defectors, because cooperators are exploited and defectors have more offspring, so any cooperative cluster is undermined by invading defectors.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- Altruism that seems individually irrational is explained by two mechanisms: repeated interactions change the game's structure so cooperating now can be rational because it elicits future cooperation, and kin selection means genes for altruism are favored because altruists directed toward kin are disproportionately helping other altruists who share those genes.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- Coordination dilemmas like Rousseau's Stag Hunt are not Prisoner's Dilemmas: in a Prisoner's Dilemma the worst outcome is to cooperate while your partner defects, but in a Stag Hunt the worst outcome is mutual defection, and crucially neither party has any incentive to lie if they can communicate—so the obstacle is assurance, not greed.Steven Pinker on Common Knowledge
- In the Prisoner's Dilemma, even if the two prisoners could communicate it would not solve their problem, because neither has grounds to trust the other and each remains tempted to defect; they are doomed to the second-worst mutual-defection outcome, which is what makes it a tragedy.Steven Pinker on Common Knowledge
- In the prisoner's dilemma, the payoff structure makes defection individually rational—the best outcome is to defect while the other cooperates—yet if both defect they are worse off than if both had cooperated, creating a dilemma where individually rational choices produce a socially worse outcome.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- God cannot be a deceiver because deception and fraud spring from defect, and God, as a supremely perfect being in whom all perfections exist and who is wholly superior to all defect, cannot engage in deception.A History of Philosophy | 33 Descartes' Meditations 2
- In the prisoner's dilemma, the structure of the world creates a tension where two actors are collectively best off cooperating (staying quiet) but each is individually better off defecting given uncertainty about the other's choice, so both defect and reach a worse outcome than if they had cooperated.269 | Sahar Heydari Fard on Complexity, Justice, and Social Dynamics