cycling
A breakdown of transitivity in collective or multicriterial decisions, where each option can be beaten by another in an endless loop with no stable winner.
As defined in Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse
Where it comes up · 2
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- Condorcet's Paradox—a result dating to the 11th century—shows that with three choices, three choosers, and disagreement, democracy may be radically indeterminate: the sequence and rules have more influence on the outcome than the preferences being aggregated, because there are multiple internal majorities (A over B, B over C, C over A) and any decision must violate one of them.Michael Munger on Choosing in Groups
- No surviving polity is genuinely majoritarian; all stable countries adopt anti-majoritarian institutions (two-thirds rules, committees, multiple houses, vetoes, the Electoral College) that control the indeterminacy problem and produce determinate—if arbitrary—choices, because the alternative is not endless cycling but revolution, as seen in revolutionary France (1792-1794) and recent Egypt, where the inability to create institutions accepted as legitimate led from democracy to dictatorship.Michael Munger on Choosing in Groups
- Cycling is not specific to voting but arises whenever preferences or considerations are aggregated, including a single person making a multicriterial decision (e.g., ranking cars by looks, price, and safety); aggregating multiple criteria works like aggregating multiple voters, so the law—and the triage case in particular, which combines abstract injury severity with the parties' preferences—is structurally prone to the same cycling.Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse
- Once cycling exists, the disturbing feature is not merely that order matters but that whoever controls the order of pairwise votes can determine the winner—by choosing which candidates face off first, the agenda-setter can engineer any desired outcome.Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse
- Majority rule, despite its reverence as fair, is non-transitive like Rock-Paper-Scissors—rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, but paper beats rock—so without restricting the order of comparisons, decision-making spins in an endless cycle with no reliable outcome.Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse
- With three candidates and an electorate split into thirds with rotated preferences, pairwise majority votes produce a cycle: a two-thirds majority prefers Al to Bea and Bea to Chloe, yet a two-thirds majority prefers Chloe to Al—demonstrating that majority rule in pairwise comparisons fails to yield a single transitive outcome.Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse
- Kenneth Arrow proved that no collective decision system satisfying elementary non-dictatorship assumptions can avoid both cycling and dependence on irrelevant alternatives; one perversity must always be present, so the possibility of manipulation is ubiquitous in genuine collective choice.Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse