cognitive liberty
A proposed right to self-determination over one's own brain and mental experiences, encompassing mental privacy, freedom of thought, and the freedom to enhance, alter, or protect one's mind from non-consensual interference.
As defined in 229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
Where it comes up · 1
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- The narrative that workers can simply quit and go elsewhere if they dislike a workplace policy is false when every employer adopts the same practice and it becomes the new baseline; therefore consent under economic pressure is not genuine consent, which is why the default should start with a protected right to cognitive liberty.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
- Cognitive liberty as a right to self-determination spans the full spectrum: the right to enhance one's brain and also the right to 'break' it—for instance erasing painful memories or treating intractable depression—while also safeguarding against others doing so without consent.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
- A right to cognitive liberty would permit limited workplace uses—like detecting whether a commercial driver is drowsy—only if narrowly tailored so that the single relevant signal is captured and broader inferences about how a person thinks and feels are not, with the burden on parties to seek and justify narrow exceptions to the default of protection.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
- Establishing a right to cognitive liberty at the international human rights level would change the default rule so that protection over self-determination of our brains and mental experiences is the baseline, requiring corporations and governments to seek narrowly tailored exceptions to access or manipulate brain data rather than individuals having to opt out.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
- An international right to cognitive liberty can be created by updating three rights already recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ICCPR: the right to privacy (to explicitly include mental privacy), freedom of thought (expanded beyond religion to bar punishing or manipulating thoughts), and self-determination (recognized at the individual level over brains and mental experiences)—achievable via a Human Rights Committee general comment without a new vote.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
- Unlike the era of surveillance capitalism, which was already a fait accompli by the time it was named, the age of brain surveillance has not yet arrived; millions of headsets exist but neurotech is not yet part of everyday life, giving society a brief, closing window to establish a right to cognitive liberty before normalization makes the conversation too late.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
- Neurotechnology holds great promise for health and wellbeing when individuals are empowered to choose how they use it, but it also risks becoming the most dystopian technology ever unleashed on society; the choices made now—beginning with recognizing a right to cognitive liberty—will shape which outcome prevails, with nothing less than the meaning of being human at stake.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology
- A right to cognitive liberty does not ban technology nor make mental privacy absolute; like all privacy rights it balances individual against social interests, so in limited national security circumstances with compelling evidence, using brain-reading on a specific person could be justified if it is the least intrusive alternative and consistent with human rights.229 | Nita Farahany on Ethics, Law, and Neurotechnology