bargaining range
The set of mutually acceptable peaceful splits of the contested 'pie' that both sides prefer to the costs of war; war becomes likely when this range narrows to a sliver or disappears.
As defined in Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
Where it comes up · 2
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- All explanations for why rivals fail to find a peaceful bargain fall into five buckets: (1) uncertainty/imperfect information combined with incentives to bluff, (2) commitment problems such as preventive war when one side will be much stronger later, (3) unchecked leaders who don't internalize war's costs or have private incentives to fight, (4) intangible or 'stable' preferences like status, vengeance, or ideology that aren't in the material pie, and (5) misperceptions—persistently wrong beliefs about the other side.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- When uncertainty and the commitment problem are layered on top of one another, they create impersonal situational forces that drastically narrow the space for a peaceful agreement; leaders' mistakes and foibles—which observers tend to overestimate—then become crucial only because the room to find a deal was already so small.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- War is so costly and ruinous that it very seldom makes sense to fight; rivals can look at relative strength and find a bargained split of the 'pie' that makes both sides better off than destroying part of it in war, so most of the time peace prevails and sustained fighting only happens when something rips actors out of that gravitational pull toward peace.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- The expected outcome of a Taiwan-China war can be represented on a 'sovereignty scale' ranging from complete Taiwanese autonomy to zero Taiwanese sovereignty (full PRC control), and a war is costly for both parties such that they would prefer to negotiate a compromise settlement within a bargaining range rather than fight.What Everyone Gets Wrong about China Invading Taiwan