bargaining game
A subclass of coordination games concerning division of resources (money, time, effort), where players demand shares and over-demanding yields poor payoffs.
As defined in 113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
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- Splitting a bargaining population into two identity groups (men/women, races) introduces an asymmetry: identity markers let actors condition strategies on group membership ('type A treats type B this way'), which unlocks a whole class of inequitable equilibria that cannot evolve without groups, and these inequitable conventions pop out of the dynamics robustly regardless of model details—even though, in the basic model, which group ends up advantaged is an accident of history.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- Coordination games are scenarios with common interest where players get shared payoffs by coordinating their behavior, but multiple ways to coordinate exist so the interesting question is how actors settle on one; bargaining games are a subclass concerning resource division (money, time, effort), which is ubiquitous in human life and requires coordination.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- In a bargaining game where players can demand a third, half, or two-thirds of a resource (with overdemand yielding poor payoffs), the equal-split outcome is a special symmetric equilibrium where both players do the exact same thing and perfectly divide the resource; philosophers like Jason Alexander and Brian Skyrms and economists like Peyton Young have used this to explain why norms of justice and fairness exist, while unequal divisions (e.g., one-third/two-thirds, or even 99/1) are equally valid equilibria.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- Taking a meta step to escape an inequitable equilibrium is more plausible in bargaining than in the prisoner's dilemma: in the prisoner's dilemma even allowing communication does not guarantee cooperation (the only equilibrium is bad), whereas the bargaining game has a fair equilibrium available—but conversation alone may still fail because those getting more benefit from getting more and often engage in special reasoning to justify the status quo that benefits them.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- The argument that bargaining across a society should always yield fair outcomes—because nobody accepts an unfair amount and so refuses to play—is a poor analysis, because people make rational choices given the social situation they are actually in, which can lock in inequitable conventions even when each disadvantaged actor is behaving sensibly.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness