attribute
In the metaphysics of Descartes and Spinoza, a fundamental way of conceiving or expressing substance; the essential property or quality through which substance manifests itself. For Descartes: thought (mind) and extension (body) are two qualitatively different attributes. For Spinoza: thought and extension are two of infinitely many attributes of the one substance
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz
Where it comes up · 3
- A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza7 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 37 Reason and Emotions in Spinoza1 claim
Most important claims · 9 of 9Search all claims for “attribute” →
- Descartes maintains a qualitative dualism of mind and body—that thinking things (mind) and extending things (body) are qualitatively different substances—within a theistic metaphysical context, whereas Spinoza is a quantitative monist (one substance) with qualitative dualism (thought and extension as qualitatively different attributes).A History of Philosophy | 38 Spinoza (continued), Leibniz
- God has infinite attributes, but only two attributes—thought and extension—are known to us; Spinoza does not claim we know all of God's attributes but only that there may be infinite other attributes beyond what we experience as thought and mind or extension and body.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: opinion or imagination (fragmentary awareness of particulars), reason or knowledge of the second kind (universal truths commonly known to all), and intuition (knowledge from adequate ideas of absolute essence, which is intuitively certain, clear, distinct, and beyond all doubt), and he gives little credence to opinion and imagination because they are fragmentary, confused, and merely empirical.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- In Spinoza's system, there is no notion of separate substances; there are only distinguishable attributes and modes, so one finite mode can be distinguished from another finite mode but not by virtue of substance distinction.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Spinoza is a pantheist who rejects both of Descartes's dualities—the mind-body dualism and the God-nature dualism—in favor of a metaphysical monism where God and nature refer to one and the same thing, with God emphasizing the intelligible rational side and nature emphasizing the material changing side, mirroring the Stoic double-aspect monism of logos and matter.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Spinoza's definition of God as 'a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting in infinite attributes of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality' logically follows from his definitions of self-causation and substance, with the conclusion that God necessarily exists because God's essence involves existence.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Spinoza insists that his technical terms—particularly substance, mind, God, and good—must never be understood in their vulgar common or figurative sense but only in the specialized sense given to them in his definitions, a caution that is essential for correctly reading his work.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Spinoza's double aspect monism posits one all-inclusive substance with at least two known attributes: thought (conscious intelligible organization parallel to the Stoic logos) and extension (material existence understood through mechanistic science), operating at both infinite and finite levels such that all finite things are modes of this single substance.A History of Philosophy | 37 Reason and Emotions in Spinoza
- The instructor analyzes Spinoza's Proposition 1 ('Substance is by nature prior to its modifications') as clearly following from the definitions of substance and mode, Proposition 2 ('Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common') as evident from definition 3, and Proposition 3 ('Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of another') as the solution to Descartes' mind-body problem, showing the logical chain through proposition 15.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza