argument from queerness
J.L. Mackie's argument against moral realism that objective moral properties would be metaphysically and epistemologically 'queer'—radically unlike anything else in nature and known by no ordinary faculty.
As defined in 207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future
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- Given credence in both nihilism (moral error theory) and moral realism, you should act as a moral realist, because if nihilism is true nothing matters—including any reasons to benefit yourself—so acting morally loses nothing, whereas if realism is true you have done genuine good; since MacAskill puts his credence near 50/50, this is not a low-probability Pascalian wager.207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future