abstract objects
Entities such as numbers and universals that exist outside space and time and are not part of the ordinary physical world.
As defined in 137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality
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- Quine wanted to be a nominalist about abstract objects and, with Goodman, tried in 'Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism' to reformulate physical theories without reference to numbers, but concluded it could not work and became a reluctant Platonist, reasoning that accepting science (e.g. the standard model of particle physics) while denying math is unintelligible — an awkward component of his radical empiricism.137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality
- It is not a coincidence that mathematical realism is called Platonism, because it is very hard to see how anything satisfying realism's constraints could be other than Platonic abstract objects — numbers are not the kinds of things observable through a telescope or discoverable by building a bigger particle accelerator, so if there are infinitely many twin prime numbers they would be something strange from an ordinary naturalist standpoint.137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality