Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
Sargent and Wallace's argument that if government debt is large and short-term enough, fiscal policy will eventually force the monetary authority to monetize debt, undermining its ability to control inflation.
As defined in Former Chief Economist (BIS) Explains Monetary Endgame
Other definitions
Economic theorem showing that if government debt is sufficiently large and short-maturity, monetary policy loses autonomy to control inflation because debt dynamics force central bank monetization regardless of policy preference
Former Chief Economist (BIS) Explains Monetary Endgame
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- There is a frightening reflexive scenario in which raising interest rates to fight inflation becomes inflationary rather than disinflationary, because higher rates so worsen government debt servicing that people expect the government to force the central bank to monetize the debt—as captured in Sargent and Wallace's 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic' and Cochrane's fiscal theory of the price level: fiscal policy ultimately dominates monetary policy.Former Chief Economist (BIS) Explains Monetary Endgame
- Sargent Wallace's 'Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic' theorem shows that if government debt is sufficiently large and short-term, monetary policy cannot control inflation independently—debt dynamics will force monetization regardless of central bank preference.Former Chief Economist (BIS) Explains Monetary Endgame