Sensibility
The faculty or capacity for receiving sensory impressions and forming sense representations; the human capacity to be affected by objects and to intuit them.
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
Other definitions
The faculty through which the mind receives sensory impressions and structures them according to the forms of space and time
A History of Philosophy | 53 Kant on Understanding
Where it comes up · 2
- A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology12 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 53 Kant on Understanding3 claims
Most important claims · 10 of 15Search all claims for “Sensibility” →
- If space and time are subjective forms of sensibility rather than objective features of reality, then in a Newtonian deterministic world of space-time causal mechanisms, it becomes possible to have real freedom of the will, real moral obligation, and belief in God, which would otherwise be impossible in a strictly deterministic universe.A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
- Anschauung (intuition) refers specifically to the mental act of being directly aware or conscious of something, distinct from both the mental content (Locke's idea, a representation) and the faculty of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit, the capacity to sense).A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
- The heterogeneity between sensibility (particular sensory experiences) and understanding (abstract universal concepts) creates a problem: how do forms of intuition and categories of understanding meet and interact? This is Kant's version of the mind-body problem.A History of Philosophy | 53 Kant on Understanding
- The faculty of sensibility functions by structuring things sequentially in time; we experience the three beeps sequentially because our sensibility is structured to experience things temporally, not because time is an objective feature of the beeps themselves.A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
- Phenomena are things as they appear to us through our forms and categories, while noumena are things-in-themselves independent of our sensibility—we can think the concept of noumena but cannot know what things are like as noumena.A History of Philosophy | 53 Kant on Understanding
- If we remove from representations all that belongs to the thinking of the understanding (substance, forces, divisibility), there remains something from pure intuition a priori: namely, extension and form—spatial extension (2D, 3D) that all phenomena share regardless of their particular shapes or sizes, which constitute a pure intuition existing in the mind as the form of sensibility.A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
- Space is a 'pure intuition a priori without a real object of sense or sensation'—a pure intuition existing in the mind as the form of sensibility that precedes and conditions all external sense perception.A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
- The science of all principles of pure, a priori intuition is called transcendental aesthetic; it isolates sensibility from understanding and strips away all that belongs to sensation, leaving only the pure form of phenomena that sensibility a priori can supply, which are space and time.A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
- Non-Euclidean geometries (developed in the late 19th century by Lobachevsky and Riemann) pose a potential challenge to Kant's claim that space is a universal a priori form of sensibility, since they propose alternative spatial structures where the parallel postulate differs.A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology
- For Newton, space and time were objective realities (absolute containers independent of content); for Kant, they are subjective forms of sensibility (forms of sense awareness), marking a huge change in how we understand the nature of spatiality and temporality.A History of Philosophy | 52 Kant's Epistemology