Popper-Miller theorem
A result by Karl Popper and David Miller showing that evidence supporting a theory generally fails to support that theory's interesting consequences, limiting inductive/probabilistic accounts of knowledge.
As defined in 253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation
Where it comes up · 2
- 253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation2 claims
- Matjaž Leonardis - Science, Identity and Probability1 claim
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- The Popper-Miller theorem (Nature, 1983) argues that the probabilistic support a piece of evidence confers on a theory cannot be understood as the evidence conferring inductive support, because by splitting a theory relative to the evidence into a deductive part and an inductive part, the evidence always decreases the probability of the inductive part.Matjaž Leonardis - Science, Identity and Probability
- The Popper-Miller theorem shows that evidence can increase the credence of a general theory while decreasing the credences of its consequences; the only consequences whose credence is increased substantially are those that merely restate or nearly restate the evidence, so interesting consequences are not supported—and this result is independent of the prior credence distribution.253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation
- Popper and Miller's theorem was written in only three or four pages, accepted by the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and Nature; some people got very angry while most didn't notice—Deutsch thinks everybody should notice and nobody should get angry.253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation