Many Worlds
The interpretation of quantum mechanics in which all measurement outcomes occur in separate, non-interfering branches of the universal wave function
As defined in AMA | December 2022
Other definitions
An interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI/Everettian) in which all possible measurement outcomes are realized, each in a branching parallel world, with no wave function collapse.
AMA | May 2025
Where it comes up · 10
- 318 - Physics Philosophy3 claims
- 414 - Strange Truths3 claims
- 323 | Jacob Barandes on Indivisible Stochastic Quantum Mechanics3 claims
- AMA | December 20223 claims
- 300 | Solo: Does Time Exist?2 claims
- David Deutsch - AI, America, Fun, & Bayes1 claim
- 178 - The Reality Illusion1 claim
- The Biggest Ideas in the Universe: Introduction1 claim
and 2 more
Most important claims · 10 of 19Search all claims for “Many Worlds” →
- John Bell showed that resolving the measurement problem leaves exactly three coherent options: (1) the wave function is not everything—add extra variables like particle positions (pilot-wave/Bohmian mechanics); (2) the wave function is not always right—it sometimes objectively collapses (GRW/objective-collapse, Penrose); or (3) keep only Schrodinger evolution with nothing besides the wave function, which forces the many-worlds branching picture.318 - Physics Philosophy
- Many Worlds and panpsychism share a structural appeal: Many Worlds avoids hidden variables and observers (just Schrödinger), while panpsychism's 'consciousness all the way down' avoids dualism and arbitrary brain-complexity justifications (just experience), suggesting fundamental consciousness might be the cost of explaining the hard problem just as branching universes is the cost of Many Worlds.AMA | May 2025
- There has only ever been one genuine explanation of quantum theory—the many-universes account developed by Schrödinger and Everett—and calling it an 'interpretation' reflects a mid-20th-century error where physicists wrongly split a theory into a meaningless mathematical formalism plus a separately assigned interpretation, neither testable alone.414 - Strange Truths
- Many-worlds struggles to recover quantum probabilities: if a measurement with a 25%/75% predicted split yields both outcomes 100% of the time across branches, it is unclear what the numbers 25 and 75 mean; simple branch-counting fails (proponents reject it because it gives the wrong numbers), so they must supply some other account connecting branch structure to probability.318 - Physics Philosophy
- Many-worlds branches differ from Lewis's possible worlds because they are all spatiotemporally connected, growing from the same trunk and capable of physically interfering with one another, whereas Lewis's worlds are spatiotemporally disconnected; moreover branching is not a sharp physical event but a vague, threshold-dependent matter tied to decoherence.318 - Physics Philosophy
- The Schrödinger equation is the quantum analog of Newton's laws: you supply the quantum state and the Hamiltonian, and it tells you the rate of change of the state with time, so with respect to time it is conceptually no different from classical mechanics—it is a fully general framework applicable to any system, not a restriction.300 | Solo: Does Time Exist?
- The major approaches to quantum foundations (Many-Worlds, pilot-wave/Bohm, objective collapse) are genuinely different theories rather than mere interpretations, because they potentially have different experimental consequences, even if in some cases those differences are not yet clearly known.323 | Jacob Barandes on Indivisible Stochastic Quantum Mechanics
- Everett's approach is essentially Bohm's approach with the localized particles dropped, in an attempt to simplify the axioms—keeping only the quantum state and Schrodinger evolution without the extra hidden-variable ingredients that Bohm's theory required.323 | Jacob Barandes on Indivisible Stochastic Quantum Mechanics
- The attempts to derive the Born rule (probability) from the Many-Worlds picture grow longer and more technically intricate over time—Everett's argument was one page, Deutsch's 15 pages, Wallace's 83 pages—and this escalating complexity raises the risk of smuggling in the assumption you are trying to prove, threatening logical circularity.323 | Jacob Barandes on Indivisible Stochastic Quantum Mechanics
- Rather than describing scientific progress as increased Bayesian credence in a theory, Popperian epistemology describes a successful experiment (e.g. an interference experiment showing an AGI in superposition across many worlds) as providing a fuller 'quiver of arrows'—a more powerful repertoire of arguments that can refute alternatives even by the standards of mistaken methodologies like empiricism.David Deutsch - AI, America, Fun, & Bayes