Launch on Warning
A posture in which nuclear forces are launched upon detection of an apparent incoming attack, before any warheads actually impact—creating risk of launching on a false alarm.
As defined in 210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
Other definitions
A nuclear policy in which a country launches its own nuclear weapons in response to detecting an incoming attack, before the enemy's weapons actually land, rather than waiting to absorb the strike.
Annie Jacobsen
Where it comes up · 4
- 210 - The Logic Of Doomsday4 claims
- Annie Jacobsen2 claims
- 70 - Beauty And Terror1 claim
- 186 - The Bomb1 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “Launch on Warning” →
- Land-based ICBMs are by definition first-strike weapons because their known, fixed locations make them targetable; in a warning scenario the president must choose within five to ten minutes between launching them (risking starting an accidental war from a false alarm) or losing them, so deterrence forces should be shifted to submarines and aircraft and the ICBM force phased out before it precipitates an accidental war.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
- Because the US adopts a Launch on Warning policy, it will not wait to absorb a nuclear attack; once SBIRS satellites detect an ICBM's hot rocket exhaust and ground radar confirms it, the command-and-control system moves to launch a counterstrike before the incoming weapon even lands.Annie Jacobsen
- Moving from a first-strike to a second-strike-only policy would be progress and remove one path to accidental war, but it would not remove the danger, because a president acting on false warning of an incoming attack could launch a 'retaliatory' strike that becomes the real first strike, triggering genuine retaliation and ending human history.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
- Two years ago Putin announced a dangerous shift in Russian nuclear policy: Russia, which had officially claimed it would wait to absorb a nuclear attack before launching, now says it will no longer wait but will launch upon detecting the trajectory of incoming missiles—mirroring the US Launch on Warning posture.Annie Jacobsen
- Keeping roughly 1,000-1,500 nuclear weapons per superpower on launch-on-warning alert status made sense only in a world expecting tens of thousands of incoming missiles with no time to react; in the modern world it serves no rational strategic need and merely increases the risk of a catastrophic error, while spending $1 trillion to upgrade these systems is irrational when reducing them would cut risk and cost.70 - Beauty And Terror
- Many high-impact risk-reduction measures can be taken in the near term without waiting for new treaties: ending presidential sole authority, prohibiting launch on warning, prohibiting first use, retiring all ICBMs (still maintaining strong deterrence while saving hundreds of billions of dollars), limiting strategic missile defense, and unilaterally reducing forces.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
- The persistence of the nuclear danger is fundamentally an education problem—the public and political leaders do not understand how dangerous the situation is—so educating them creates the political environment in which concrete reforms like ending presidential sole authority, prohibiting first use, and prohibiting launch on warning become possible.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
- Sharply reducing or eliminating land-based ICBMs would be an act of jujitsu that deprives an adversary of targets on American soil, removing the time pressure that forces a president to decide within roughly 20 minutes whether to launch; if the surviving submarine and bomber forces are invulnerable, the president can ride out an attack and contemplate longer rather than launch on warning.186 - The Bomb