Humean
In philosophy of physics, the view (after David Hume) that laws of nature are merely convenient summaries of what happens, with no independent governing force.
As defined in 178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real
Where it comes up · 3
- 244 | Katie Elliott on Metaphysics, Chance, and Explanation3 claims
- Michael Munger on the Perfect vs. the Good1 claim
- 178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real1 claim
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- Elliott favors anti-Humeanism (that laws have their own reality beyond patterns) for aesthetic reasons, but acknowledges its basic cost: the anti-Humean must say what it is they are positing — what the law-stuff actually is — which is very hard to do, making the project more interesting to pursue than the Humean alternative even though anti-Humean theories tend to look sketchy.244 | Katie Elliott on Metaphysics, Chance, and Explanation
- The economists' view of property rights is Humean—a useful convention that helps societies that adopt it—while the Lockean moral argument for property as inviolable or inalienable is taught almost nowhere in philosophy classes, where Nozick is presented mainly as a foil to Rawls believed to be decisively refuted, leaving the moral case for property without authority.Michael Munger on the Perfect vs. the Good
- Carroll is a Humean for aesthetic reasons: he wants to scrub all spookiness from his ontology, treating laws of physics not as spooky essences with their own oomph but as convenient summaries, with the ultimate ontology being a single point in a high-dimensional space evolving according to equations; his research project is to recover the manifest image (tables, chairs, causes) as emergent, higher-level, approximate, useful structures rather than burdening the fundamental ontology with them.244 | Katie Elliott on Metaphysics, Chance, and Explanation
- Faced with whether the clap-and-sound correlation is causal or a coincidence, Carroll declines to use the language of causes and effects at the level of fundamental physics, preferring to speak only of correlations, patterns, and differential equations; cause-and-effect language becomes appropriate only in the macroscopic world with incomplete information and an arrow of time, where it is an emergent higher-level relation.244 | Katie Elliott on Metaphysics, Chance, and Explanation
- There is no argument that every true generalization about how the world works must have an explanation; some generalizations may be explanatorily brute, and any explanation that exists will itself bottom out in something else that may not be further explainable—so intellectual humility requires accepting brute facts rather than demanding self-explanation.178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real