GRU
Soviet/Russian military intelligence agency, referenced via the defector memoir Inside the Aquarium to illustrate the intensity of state espionage.
As defined in Leopold Aschenbrenner — 2027 AGI, China/US super-intelligence race, & the return of history
Where it comes up · 8
- Why The West Is Losing The Global Shadow War with Iran, Russia and China | Seth Jones5 claims
- Cia Russia Expert On What The West Gets Wrong About Putin S Russia Sean Wiswesser4 claims
- Why The West Is Losing The Global Hybrid War Ep. 65 Seth Jones3 claims
- 13 Szabolcs Panyi Audio Why Hungary Supports Russia Orban S Grand Strategy2 claims
- The Next Great War Is Already Taking Shape. What Happens Next Decides Everything Jack Watling2 claims
- Leopold Aschenbrenner — 2027 AGI, China/US super-intelligence race, & the return of history1 claim
- 310 - Social Media Public Trust1 claim
- Inside Russian Intelligence: CIA Insider on Putin’s Playbook, Ukraine & the Next War1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 19Search all claims for “GRU” →
- Twitter's hacked-materials policy was written in response to Russian military intelligence hacking the DNC and Clinton campaign and releasing files at opportune times (like the day of the Access Hollywood tape), not for Hunter Biden's laptop; the laptop case was the platform deciding whether and how to enforce a pre-existing policy.310 - Social Media Public Trust
- Irregular warfare—actions below the threshold of conventional war including offensive cyber operations, covert action, information operations, and support to state or non-state allies—has become the dominant mode of competition among major powers because direct conventional war between nuclear-armed states risks escalation to nuclear conflict.Why The West Is Losing The Global Shadow War with Iran, Russia and China | Seth Jones
- Because direct conventional war among nuclear powers risks escalation up to nuclear war, major powers like China, Russia, and the US instead channel their competition into irregular and hybrid actions, which do not carry the same escalation risk—explaining the renewed focus on this kind of warfare.Why The West Is Losing The Global Hybrid War Ep. 65 Seth Jones
- No one in the Russian government had more power, authority, or responsibility for planning and pushing the 2022 invasion than the intelligence services; the military, if anything, was seconded to the intelligence services in terms of planning and advocacy for the war.Cia Russia Expert On What The West Gets Wrong About Putin S Russia Sean Wiswesser
- Russian irregular warfare attacks (which Russia calls active measures) in Europe quadrupled between 2022 and 2023 and tripled again between 2023 and 2024, targeting transportation, government critical infrastructure such as pipelines and undersea fiber-optic cables, and defense industry firms supplying Ukraine, using explosives, blunt instruments, shadow-fleet cable cutting, and electronic attack.Why The West Is Losing The Global Hybrid War Ep. 65 Seth Jones
- Russia is generally competent and notably more aggressive than China in its willingness to conduct kinetic irregular actions—blowing up warehouses, conducting assassinations and poisonings of defectors in Western countries, and leveraging private military companies in Africa for resource extraction and train-advise-assist missions.Why The West Is Losing The Global Hybrid War Ep. 65 Seth Jones
- The two GRU officers who attempted to assassinate Sergei Skripal in 2018 displayed horrible tradecraft—flying into Heathrow, taking a train directly to Salisbury, casing the target's home and neighborhood under full camera coverage, and returning straight to the airport without ever mixing up their route or checking for surveillance.Cia Russia Expert On What The West Gets Wrong About Putin S Russia Sean Wiswesser
- Because Russia already perceives itself to be in an existential conflict above the war threshold with Europe—believing, for instance, that the Western volunteers and trainers in Ukraine are state-controlled foreign military forces just as Russia's own GRU runs proxies—the West's risk envelope is wider than its self-imposed policy envelope, meaning it could train Ukrainians inside Ukraine without genuinely escalating from the Russian point of view.The Next Great War Is Already Taking Shape. What Happens Next Decides Everything Jack Watling
- Russia regards its wave of sabotage in Europe not as escalation but as retaliation for the damage inflicted via Ukraine using Western-funded strikes, and because they believe they have suffered far more harm than they have inflicted, the West cannot deter this activity by threatening punishment—since from Russia's perspective the punishment is already happening—so it must be managed as a persistent threat rather than expected to be deterred away.The Next Great War Is Already Taking Shape. What Happens Next Decides Everything Jack Watling
- Western experts mistakenly equate the FSB with MI5 or the FBI, but these are vast monolithic corporations: the FSB numbers around 400,000 (including 200,000 border guards) with offices in every town, the GRU 70,000-100,000 including 14 Spetsnaz brigades and signals/satellite architecture, and the SVR about 30,000—and during the 1990s budget crisis all three took over companies and ran rackets that persist today.Cia Russia Expert On What The West Gets Wrong About Putin S Russia Sean Wiswesser