Combined Arms
Coordinated use of different military branches (infantry, armor, artillery, air) in concert; Zeihan says Russia has lost this capacity.
As defined in 355 - A Falling World
Other definitions
A military doctrine and practice of integrating different types of military forces (infantry, armor, air support, artillery, etc.) in a coordinated manner to achieve battlefield objectives, as opposed to using forces in isolation.
Battlegrounds w/ H.R. McMaster | Lithuania: On the Frontline of European SecurityA military doctrine integrating different types of units (infantry, armor, artillery, air force) in coordinated operations to attack enemy weak points with all available firepower simultaneously
National DISINTEGRATION and How to Stop It feat. Peter Zeihan
Where it comes up · 5
- 355 - A Falling World2 claims
- 71 Sir Lawrence Freedman How The War In Ukraine Will End2 claims
- Nato Soldier Who Fought In Ukraine Why This War Isn T What You Think Jakub Jajcay2 claims
- Battlegrounds w/ H.R. McMaster | Lithuania: On the Frontline of European Security1 claim
- National DISINTEGRATION and How to Stop It feat. Peter Zeihan1 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “Combined Arms” →
- The 2023 summer offensive failed because, contrary to popular belief, NATO advisers urged Ukraine to use its newly supplied tanks and armor for a NATO-doctrine combined arms breach — concentrating force in a narrow sector to break through — but Ukraine rejected this, instead dispersing its armor into small units of one to three to take tree lines piecemeal, an approach that achieved no significant breakthrough.Nato Soldier Who Fought In Ukraine Why This War Isn T What You Think Jakub Jajcay
- Ukraine received training in small-unit combined-arms tactics (50-person groups with local initiative) that proved effective in 2022 counter-offensives in Donetsk and Kharkiv; in 2023 counter-offensive, NATO trained them in full combined-arms (infantry, armor, artillery, helicopters, air force coordination) which requires air superiority Ukraine lacks, causing tactical failures.National DISINTEGRATION and How to Stop It feat. Peter Zeihan
- Drones will be important in all future wars for surveillance and cheap mass production, but they are vulnerable, slow, easily jammed or shot down, carry little punch, and lose range as payload grows; Ukrainian troops often prefer artillery and use FPV drones only as a substitute because shells are in short supply, and the war's conditions — a saturated, static land front — have flattered drones, so they must be kept in context rather than treated as the future of war.71 Sir Lawrence Freedman How The War In Ukraine Will End
- A World War I-style breakthrough is unlikely in Ukraine because the core problem is mobility: anyone moving on a battlefield saturated with surveillance drones can be seen, making breakthroughs very hard except where nobody is watching (as Ukraine did at Kherson); even if a hole is punched in the line, neither side has the mobility to exploit it, so advances come only as dribbles forming small salients.71 Sir Lawrence Freedman How The War In Ukraine Will End
- Russia's military, despite appearing impressive in parades, is fundamentally a 'Potemkin army' that lacks discipline, training, combined arms coordination, and logistics; its poor performance in Ukraine revealed structural weaknesses that no rational adversary would want to expose but Putin displayed anyway.Battlegrounds w/ H.R. McMaster | Lithuania: On the Frontline of European Security
- The Russian advance relies fundamentally on mass — flooding the battlefield with small disorganized groups that occasionally find a gap or identify targets for artillery/drones — but it is so slow and costly that, at the current rate, achieving any strategic outcome would take years or decades while incurring casualties in the hundreds of thousands, which is unsustainable even for Russia.Nato Soldier Who Fought In Ukraine Why This War Isn T What You Think Jakub Jajcay
- It is Russian weakness, not aggression, that brings nuclear war into play: Russia's army fights as a mob with weapons having lost combined-arms competence, so if it reaches Poland and faces NATO the casualty ratios will be obscene, yet it must still reach the Vistula, so it would attempt a short brutal negotiation to break NATO and, failing that, launch strategic nukes because without securing these positions the Russian state ceases to function within ~15 years.355 - A Falling World
- Russia's geography — poor wheat land, no nationwide road network, ~5,000 miles of borderless flat terrain that has invited 50-odd invasions — means its only viable defensive strategy is to expand until it reaches natural barriers (e.g. the Carpathians) that narrow access to about 500 miles of funneled kill zones, which requires conquering all or part of ~15 countries including all of Ukraine; hence this war 'had to happen.'355 - A Falling World