Bayesian prior
In Bayesian reasoning, the probability assigned to a hypothesis before considering new evidence; Aguirre gives an 82% prior that inflation occurred.
As defined in 51 | Anthony Aguirre on Cosmology, Zen, Entropy, and Information
Where it comes up · 3
- AMA | October 20212 claims
- 51 | Anthony Aguirre on Cosmology, Zen, Entropy, and Information1 claim
- AMA | December 20211 claim
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “Bayesian prior” →
- Faced with an entity performing physics-defying actions, one should assign low prior to a deity and higher prior to a highly advanced technological civilization, because the deity concept may not even be coherent — it requires violating our understanding of the universe and is built by exaggerating human attributes to infinity (omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence) in ways that are hard to make rigorous, whereas advanced aliens require no such violation.AMA | December 2021
- The question 'why is there something rather than nothing' is not a sensible answerable question, like asking for the largest prime number; grammatical form does not guarantee a meaningful answer, and there is simply no such thing as the reason why there is something rather than nothing.AMA | October 2021
- A good Bayesian assigns near-zero prior to almost nothing logically coherent, and stating a confident answer (like 'dark matter exists' or 'many worlds is correct') reflects high credence, not certainty; it is a mistake to attribute certainty to a speaker simply because they make a claim without footnoting their numerical credence.AMA | October 2021
- Aguirre estimates an 82% prior probability that cosmic inflation actually happened in our universe, while Carroll is more skeptical at around 50-something percent.51 | Anthony Aguirre on Cosmology, Zen, Entropy, and Information