factual

Free Action Must Be Predictable To Count As One's Own

The idealized notion of free will as the capacity to act beyond one's genes, environment, and rationality is incoherent because if someone actually acted that way they would be seen as crazy rather than free; we attribute actions to a person—and hold them responsible—precisely when those actions reliably extend from their history, beliefs, and inclinations.

factualpending

Speaker

Paul Bloom

Evidence Quote

“you want your actions to be you know the actions we view as normal actions which we bear more responsibility naturally extend from one's history and one's inclinations and one's circumstances we kind of want something where if we were to get it we say that that's grotesque”

Source

183 - A Conversation With Paul Bloom— Making Sense with Sam Harris
Created: 6/14/2026, 2:07:02 AM

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