factual
Disagreement Objection Is Epistemological Not Metaphysical
The objection from moral disagreement is fundamentally epistemological—the worry that there is no way even in principle to adjudicate fundamental moral disagreements—but even in the worst case where such disagreements are intractable, this would not by itself impugn moral realism, which is in the first instance a metaphysical claim about what exists, not about whether everyone can be convinced.
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Speaker
Russ Shafer-LandauEvidence Quote
“it's not clear to me why that would impugn realism, 'cause realism is in the first instance a claim, a metaphysical claim. It's a claim about what there is, namely moral reality, not a form of creation.”
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:20:09 AM
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