causal
Approval regulation creates R&D incentives
FDA 'approval regulation'—the FDA acting as a veto player granting access to profitable markets—creates very powerful incentives for R&D and for running randomized controlled trials; a Good Housekeeping seal-of-approval model would weaken or eliminate those incentives because firms could simply sell offline and advertise their way into the market, as the patent medicine industry did.
causalpending
Speaker
Daniel CarpenterEvidence Quote
“the mechanism of what I would call approval regulation, which is, basically, the FDA as a veto player granting access to profitable markets creates very, very powerful incentives for R&D... if you can just go and sell it offline and then advertise your way into the marketplace? This is exactly the way the patent medicine industry worked.”
Created: 6/13/2026, 3:23:23 AM
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