normative
Avoid Both Coarse and Fine-Grained Consciousness Criteria
When specifying how similar AI cognitive capacities must be to human ones to count morally, we should avoid both extremes: too coarse-grained criteria would let any plant, fungus, or microbe trivially qualify, while too fine-grained criteria (requiring exact carbon-brain chemical-electrical signals) would wrongly rule out consciousness in reptiles, amphibians, fishes, and octopuses; different cognitive systems may realize similar value in different ways.
normativepending
Speaker
Jeff SeboEvidence Quote
“We should be open to the possibility that different kinds of cognitive systems can realize broadly similar forms of value in different kinds of ways and not rule that out by fiat.”
Source
Do All Creatures, Great and Small, and Made From Silicon, Have Rights? (with Jeff Sebo)— EconTalkCreated: 6/13/2026, 12:21:58 AM
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