normative
Brute laws vs brute normativity in poetic naturalism
Carroll argues on Bayesian grounds we should stop asking 'why' once additional hypotheses no longer improve explanatory or predictive power, even treating physical laws as brute facts; the question is whether the same stopping rule applies to the normativity of truth—whether 'correct reasoning ought to bind belief' can be a brute fact justified pragmatically by science's long-run success, or whether there is a principled distinction between accepting brute laws and accepting brute normativity, and ultimately what makes a belief wrong rather than merely less useful within poetic naturalism.
normativepending
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“within poetic naturalism, what ultimately makes a belief wrong rather than merely less useful?”
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:30:56 AM
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