causal
No moral realism can settle action, on pain of regress
It is not merely that one could hold moral realism plus the claim that it does not tell us what to do; rather, no moral realist view could tell us what to do, because moral realism mixes two issues — the cheap reality and independence of some truths, and deliberation and action — and the action issue cannot be packed into the objects, since we can always ask whether to consult those objects rather than others, and that further question cannot itself be another factual ought-claim without infinite regress.
causalpending
Speaker
Justin Clarke-DoaneEvidence Quote
“we can always ask ourselves whether to consult those objects or other objects, and that can't be another factual claim on pain of regress”
Source
137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality— Sean Carroll's MindscapeCreated: 6/13/2026, 12:21:37 AM
Your notes
Loading notes...