factual
Zombies Are Conceivable, Implying Consciousness Is Extra
A philosopher's zombie is a being physically and functionally identical to a conscious person but with no subjective experience; while no one claims zombies actually exist, the idea seems logically coherent and conceivable, and an entire physically-identical zombie universe with no consciousness seems contradiction-free—which shows that consciousness is something special and extra not entailed by the physical facts, posing the hard problem as 'why aren't we zombies?'
factualpending
Speaker
David ChalmersEvidence Quote
“There is a universe which is physically identical to ours, but in which nobody has subjective experience... one way to pose the hard problem is saying what differentiates our world from that world?”
Source
25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation— Sean Carroll's MindscapeCreated: 6/13/2026, 3:32:39 AM
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