causal
Natural-kinds rescue of the one true morality fails
The realist move (made by David Enoch and Tristram McPherson) of saying one moral-like property is the 'natural kind' that carves nature at the joints — the one that 'glows' as the true morality — fails by an argument analogous to Shamik Dasgupta's in natural science: either the claim that these properties are natural kinds carries no normative import (so it is like learning something is merely 'brown' — irrelevant to deliberation, à la Hume), or it does carry normative import telling us which to use, in which case the pluralism problem simply re-arises at the meta-level with natural-kind-sub-one versus natural-kind-sub-two.
causalpending
Speaker
Justin Clarke-DoaneEvidence Quote
“if the problem is a problem to start with, it's equally a problem with the alleged solution”
Source
137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality— Sean Carroll's MindscapeCreated: 6/13/2026, 12:21:37 AM
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