normative
Anti-Skeptical Priors As An Escape From Boltzmann Brains
Just as standard Bayesianism rules out brain-in-a-vat skeptical theories not by evidence but by assigning them intrinsically low prior plausibility, one could posit a substantive philosophical commitment that the predicament of being a normal human has higher rational prior than being a randomly created Boltzmann brain, letting you accept ordinary cosmology and deny you are a Boltzmann brain even amid many of them—but only if you genuinely commit to that prior as the rational one, not merely pair a theory with a convenient distribution.
normativepending
Speaker
Adam ElgaEvidence Quote
“Maybe there's just a rational prior that favors the first sort of predicament over the second.”
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:24:14 AM
Your notes
Loading notes...