causal

Non-Branching Preferences Can't Constrain Branching Preferences

Albert's core objection to the decision-theoretic derivation is that it is simply mistaken to think one's preferences among non-branching futures can constrain, on pain of irrationality, one's preferences among branching futures; branching opens an entirely new set of options (e.g. preferring to be richer in the branch where one is fat), and there is no reason the limited non-branching preferences should determine these new preferences.

causalpending

Speaker

David Albert

Evidence Quote

“Where did you get the idea that you could infer everything about your preferences among the branching cases? From your preferences among the non-branching.”

Source

36 | David Albert on Quantum Measurement and the Problems with Many-Worlds— Sean Carroll's Mindscape
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:23:03 AM

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