causal

Rule-Of-Law Game Is Incentive-Compatible

If you model classical-liberal institutions as a grand game (per Huizinga's Homo Ludens) where one institution—the courts—enforces the written rules, then it remains incentive-compatible for smart long-range actors to pretend the rules govern their actions so they have a better case in court; but this breaks down as court authority erodes and rulings are increasingly ignored.

causalpending

Speaker

Dean Ball

Evidence Quote

“you should model the institutions of classical liberalism as this kind of grand game. As long as there's one institution that enforces the rules of the game, then maybe it's incentive-compatible for the actors to remain.”

Source

Claude, War, and the State of the Republic (with Dean Ball)— EconTalk
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:13:39 AM

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