The problem of idealism inherent in Fichte and Schelling's rejection of the thing-in-itself is that it leads necessarily to solipsism: if mind creates both the form and content of consciousness, there is nothing external to mind and potentially nothing but the individual mind's own representations.

causalpending

Speaker

Unidentified Speaker — Great Minds - Part 4 - Hegel: The Phenomenology of Geist [0F8REGux8qs]

Evidence Quote

“if there's no ding on zik to be formulated no matter no content then that means that there is no external world that the mind creates everything both the content and the form of human cognition”

Source

Great Minds - Part 4 - Hegel: The Phenomenology of Geist— Michael Sugrue
Created: 8/11/2026, 1:23:02 AM

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