causal

Base rate fallacy confuses probability with confirmation

The base rate fallacy identified by Kahneman and Tversky occurs because people confronting a reliable test for a rare disease conflate two genuinely relevant but distinct dimensions—the low probability of having the disease and the high confirmation (probability increase) provided by the positive result—and tend to answer with a number clustering around the normalized Bayes factor, deferring to confirmation rather than probability.

causalpending

Speaker

Branden Fitelson

Evidence Quote

“There's how probable it is that you have disease, the probability of the disease, and then there's the confirmation... But they go in different directions. So it can be very confusing.”

Source

315 | Branden Fitelson on the Logic and Use of Probability— Sean Carroll's Mindscape
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:14:37 AM

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